

Security Information

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Date: 21 MAR 1979 By: 026

TO: Assistant Director, Office of Collection
and Dissemination

FROM: [REDACTED] Organization and
Methods Examiner

SUBJECT: Report on Office of Intelligence Coordination,
Area Top Secret Control Office

1. Problem -- Review of operating methods of the Area Top Secret Control Office, Office of Intelligence Coordination, for the purpose of insuring compliance with basic Agency regulations and establishing uniform operating methods throughout CIA.

2. a. INCLUSIVE SURVEY DATES: 19 March 1952

b. AREA TOP SECRET CONTROL OFFICER:

Deputy Top Secret Control
Officer:

Alternate Top Secret Control
Officer:

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3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. Obvious Departures from Basic Agency System:

- (1) OIC receives documents direct from outside Agencies and assigns and OIC control number. Because of its coordination function, OIC reproduces such documents and disseminates copies to other CIA areas. The final document, deriving from above, becomes an IAC document, bears an IAC number and a new OIC control number.
- (2) OIC does not indicate on documents or on weekly logs "Copy No. ___ of ___ copies". Reason given for this omission is that frequently additional copies must be reproduced and distributed. The only record of total number of copies reproduced appears on the document receipt returned to Reproduction (which has a special installation in North Building to service OIC).

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- (3) OIC hand-carries documents, memoranda, etc, which require immediate action directly to the addressee in other Areas without clearance through Area TSCO, and obtains a signature on the OIC log.
- (4) Comparison of OIC outgoing logs with incoming logs of other Areas reveals that OIC does not record in its log all documents transmitted outside OIC.

b. Security Hazards:

- (1) OIC should have a complete record on file of the number of copies reproduced of any TS document, a listing of OIC's final disposition of each copy and a document receipt or log signature to support each disposition (see 3a.(2)).
- (2) The "Seen By" column of the green cover sheet is not signed. The examiner understands that this problem is not peculiar to OIC alone, but that many officials object to the requirement of a signature in the "Seen By" column.
- (3) The practice of hand-carrying documents to personnel of other Areas -- by-passing the Area TSCO -- (see 3a.(3)) constitutes a security hazard within the other Area.
- (4) Failure to record in logs documents transmitted to other Areas is a dangerous omission. It also raises the possibility to the examiner that documents are being transmitted outside the Agency without log entry, in which case Central Top Secret Control would have no knowledge of the transaction and, presumably, no follow-ups would be initiated if the document were lost in transit.
- (5) OIC requests interpretation of Regulation [REDACTED] which states: "Preliminary drafts, copies, carbons, stencils, stenographic notes, work sheets, and the like, pertaining to classified matter of all classifications, will be torn or shredded into small pieces, and placed in envelopes or other receptacles conspicuously marked "SECRET". The implication of the regulations seems to be that Top Secret material of the above categories can be disposed of in the manner described. The examiner agrees with OIC that Top Secret drafts, copies, stencils, etc. should be accorded the same destruction treatment as Top Secret documents -- excluding, of course, execution of destruction certificates.

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c. Unique Problems:

- (1) OIC has primary responsibility for coordinating intelligence within CIA and with outside Agencies. This responsibility involved considerable transmission and reproduction of documents, as well as preparation of OIC comments on documents originated by other Agencies or Areas.
- (2) OIC must work on a constant "deadline" basis in preparation for the weekly IAC meeting.
- (3) "Completed" actions in OIC become IAC documents. Hence, documents are filed by the IAC number, and the weekly log constitutes the only record of CIA control numbers. In addition, a card index is maintained by subject and cross-referenced to the IAC and CIA control numbers.
- (4) OIC must deal with several attachments to each document due to the nature of its work. As a result, difficulty is encountered in having sufficient space on the standard log form for listing of attachments.

d. General Problems:

- (1) The present numbering system poses a basic problem for this Area. The problem appears to be Agency-wide, though not as acute in some Areas. The examiner will discuss the problem in detail and recommendations for its solution in Part 4, Conclusions.
- (2) OIC recommends that the document receipt form should be revised to read "Copy Nos." rather than "No. of Copies" as there is a tendency to simply list the number of copies attached rather than actual copy numbers.
- (3) OIC requests permission, on the basis of workload, to make only one green sheet to cover all copies of the same document forwarded to the same Area. The examiner does not recommend approval inasmuch as this would be a violation of regulations, and would impose an extra burden on receiving Areas.
- (4) OIC requests that single stamps be prepared bearing both "TOP SECRET" and "Security Information". If this has not been done, the examiner recommends that such stamps should be prepared and distributed to all Areas and Sub-Stations.

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4. CONCLUSIONS:

Many of OIC's problems arise from the practice--apparently Agency-wide -- of assigning Area control numbers to documents received direct from outside Agencies, as well as to documents originated in an Area which will require action also from one or more additional CIA Areas. The result is that each action taken by an Area on a given subject in continuity will bear a separate control number and a separate green cover sheet. To cite an example -- (1) State Dept. sends a memorandum to Executive Registry which assigns an ER control number and attaches a cover sheet, (2) Executive Registry sends the memorandum to AD/SO for reply, which is assigned an SO control number and a green cover sheet is attached, (3) AD/SO sends the memorandum and the reply to OIC for memorandum of comment, which is assigned an OIC number and a green cover sheet is attached and (4) the document continues through processing, collecting numbers and cover sheets although it is in actuality one continuous processing.

In addition to the clerical work involved in such processing, other disadvantages are (1) no direct tie-in of the segments of this continuous action except through lengthy search of logs, cover sheets, etc., (2) no Central Top Secret Control of documents of concern to several Areas of CIA and to at least one outside Agency, (3) persons working with the documents must search through and sign the "Seen-By" column of each cover sheet.

The examiner will recommend under Part 5, a., a system of numbering to be used Agency-wide which it is believed will solve the multiple-numbering problem and result in a valid central control of all Top Secret documents that require multiple Area actions and/or action by outside agencies.

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5. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

a. CIA Control Numbers:

(1) Categories of Documents to be Centrally Controlled:

The examiner recommends that the following three categories of Top Secret material should be controlled Agency-wide by CIA 6-digit control numbers issued by the Central Top Secret Control Office:

- (a) All documents received from outside agencies;
- (b) CIA finished intelligence.
- (c) CIA documents of intelligence value which are of interest to and/or require action by more than one Area.

(2) Procedures recommended:

- (a) A procedure for controlling category (a) above has been proposed previously in this examiner's "Report on OO Area TSCO and Sub-Stations" dated 12 March 1952.
- (b) Documents in category (b) are assigned 6-digit control numbers under the present system and no change is recommended.
- (c) This report will recommend, therefore, a procedure for controlling documents in category (c) by CIA 6-digit numbers.

(1) Each Area TSCO would be assigned a block of 6-digit CIA numbers by CTSC to be used exclusively for documents in category (c).

(2) A number from this block would be assigned and would be followed by a dash and the symbol of the originating Area, i.e., a document originated in the Office of Operations would bear a number such as 034596-00.¹ As the documents progressed through the Areas to be acted upon, each Area would assign 034596 to its document and add dash (office symbol).

1. If the document originated by OO resulted from a document from an outside agency, OO would use the CIA number assigned to the document from the outside agency and add the dash OO.

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- (3) If in the course of processing any Area prepared more than one document the number would be assigned 034596-00.1.
- (4) Each Area weekly log would list numbers issued, subject, etc., and the Central TSCO would prepare a posting record. Ideally, Central TSCO should maintain a complete central file of every document numbered; however, lack of space and staff make this unfeasible at the present time.
- b. Record of total number of copies reproduced: -- The master file copy of every document reproduced and disseminated by OIC should have attached a cover sheet listing a complete record of number of copies reproduced; the location of each copy number; and a supporting signature in the log, on a receipt, or on the cover sheet.
- c. Dissemination through control channels: -- Under no circumstances should OIC personnel hand-carry a document direct to the individual concerned regardless of its importance or urgency. Security hazard and loss of time in later locating and accounting for the document far outweigh immediate time saved.
- d. Logging of all documents disseminated outside OIC: -- The examiner recommends that OIC should be instructed to inventory documents received and disseminated in the past and forward a report to the CIA Top Secret Control Officer as soon as possible. It is also recommended that OIC should be impressed with the dangers involved in maintenance of incomplete controls.
- e. Destruction of Top Secret drafts, etc. -- The examiner recommends that Regulation [REDACTED] should be modified to the extent that preliminary drafts, stencils, copies, carbons, stenographic notes, worksheets, and any other intelligible material of Top Secret nature, would be destroyed in the same manner as Top Secret documents, excluding execution of destruction certificates.
- f. Standard distribution of IAC documents: -- OIC distributes IAC documents on the basis of a standard

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distribution list. OIC has requested permission to send a copy of this standard distribution to Central TSCO and simply enter on the weekly log "Standard Distribution". The examiner recommends approval of this method provided OIC will advise CTSC promptly as to any revisions or departures from standard distribution.

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Organization and Methods Examiner

CONCURRENCES:

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